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ARISTOTLE ON MATHEMATICAL EXISTENCE
Phil Corkum (University of Alberta)
Presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy at the Central Division meeting of the American
Philosophical Association, April, 2007
Do mathematical objects exist in some realm inaccessible to our senses? It may be tempting to deny this. For one
thing, how we could come to know mathematical truths, if such knowledge must arise from causal interaction with
non-empirical objects? However, denying that mathematical objects exist altogether has unsettling consequences. If
you deny the existence of mathematical objects, then you must reject all claims that commit you to such objects,
which means rejecting much of mathematics as it is standardly understood. For, as David Papineau (1990) vividly
puts it, it is doublethink to deny that mathematical objects exist but to continue to believe, for example, that there are
two prime numbers between ten and fifteen.
Two current responses to this problem are literalism and fictionalism. Both literalists and fictionalists deny
the existence of a world of mathematical objects distinct from the empirical world. But they differ markedly in this
denial. Literalists argue that mathematical objects simply exist in the empirical world; on this account, mathematical
assertions assert true beliefs about perceivable objects. Fictionalists, on the other hand, hold that, strictly speaking,
mathematical objects do not exist at all, and so exist in neither the empirical world nor in some realm distinct from
the empirical world. They argue that mathematical objects are not actual objects but rather harmless fictions; on this
account, mathematical assertions do not assert true beliefs about the world but merely fictional attitudes.
Although these two positions are apparently quite opposed to one another, they nonetheless have been both
ascribed to Aristotle. Indeed, as I’ll argue, Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics exhibits some of the features
characteristic of literalism and some of the features characteristic of fictionalism. However, Aristotle’s position also
exhibits features interestingly different from both literalism and fictionalism.
The paper comes in three parts. In the first part, I’ll quickly survey the variety of descriptions which
Aristotle uses to characterize the relation between mathematical objects and the perceivable world. This will help to
explain how apparently opposed positions have been ascribed to Aristotle. In the second part, I’ll discuss literalism
in contemporary philosophy of mathematics, the ascription of literalism to Aristotle and the points of agreement and
disagreement between Aristotle and literalists. In the third and final part of the paper, I’ll discuss fictionalism in
contemporary philosophy of mathematics, the ascription of fictionalism to Aristotle and the points of agreement and
disagreement between Aristotle and fictionalists.
1
Aristotle holds that mathematical objects are not something which exist apart from the physical world. Consider, for
example, Phys. 2.2:
The next point to consider is how the mathematician differs from the physicist. Obviously physical bodies
contain surfaces, volumes, lines, and points, and these are the subject matter of mathematics (193b23-25).
But if mathematical objects do not exist apart from sensible substances, how are we to take this? Are they
themselves perceivable objects? Or do mathematical objects not exist at all and talk of mathematical objects is
merely a convenient (but, strictly speaking, false) way of talking about the sensible world? It will be helpful to begin
by gathering together the relevant passages and classifying the descriptions of this relation between mathematical
objects and the sensible world. There are three classes of descriptions.
The first class of descriptions is the use of a ‘qua’-operator as the adverbial modification of a verb of
consideration.1 One such use of qua is in a negative description with the object of consideration sensible (or mobile
or physical) things. Thus Meta. M.3 (1077b20ff.):
clearly it is possible that there should also be both propositions and demonstrations about sensible
magnitudes, not however qua sensible but qua possessed of certain definite qualities.... and in the case of
mobiles there will be propositions and sciences, which treat them however not qua mobile but only qua

1

theorein: Meta. E.1 (1026a10), K.3 (1061a35ff.), M.3 (1078a24ff.). Cf. noein: De An. III.7 (431b15); skopein: Phys. II.2
(194a10); pragmateusthei: Phys. II.2 (193b31); zetein: Meta. E.1 (1025b1); endechesthai peri: Meta. M.3 (1977b21). With the
use of hos, not he, De An. III.7 (431b12).
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bodies, or again only qua planes, or only qua lines, or qua divisibles, or qua indivisibles having position, or
only qua indivisibles.2
The second class of descriptions is where the sensible is abstracted from the mathematical. Thus Meta. K.3
(1061a28-33):
the mathematician investigates abstractions for before beginning his investigation he strips off (perielon) all
the sensible qualities, e. g. weight and lightness, hardness and its contrary, and also heat and cold and the
other sensible contrarieties, and leaves only the quantitative and continuous.3
The third class of description is where the mathematical is separated from the sensible. Thus Phys. II.2 (193b31-34):
“the mathematician, though he too treats of these things [the properties of the earth and the world], ... separates
(chorizei) them; for in thought (te noesei) they are separable (chorista) from motion.”4 In separation descriptions
the verb of separation is regularly qualified in some way. For example, in the Phys. II.2 passage quoted above,
‘separable’ (chorista) is qualified with the dative, ‘in thought’ (te noesei).5 An especially interesting case of
separation terminology is the description at Meta. M.3 (1078a21-22): “[the mathematician] studies what is not
separate by separating.”
These descriptions present, at first blush, an ambiguous picture of Aristotle’s view of mathematical
existence. Is the subject matter of mathematics properties or material entities? If mathematical abstraction is the
elimination of non-mathematical properties, the subject matter of mathematics would seem to be physical or
material objects considered as if they did not have certain properties. Consideration descriptions with the object of
consideration sensible might support this view: in the Meta M.3 (1077b20ff.) passage, quoted above, the
mathematician is represented as considering sensible things (but not as sensible) and mobile things (but not as
mobile). Those who take a literalist interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics, and so hold that
mathematics studies in part a distinctly mathematical matter contained in the physical world, tend to emphasize
these descriptions, as we’ll see.
On the other hand, if abstraction is the elimination of such features of sensible substances as their matter,
the subject matter of mathematics would seem to be certain mathematical properties of sensible things⎯properties
such as triangularity. Those who take a fictionalist interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics tend to
emphasize these descriptions, as we’ll see. The ambiguity between the two pictures apparently presented by these
descriptions is noted by Mueller (1971, 162ff.) and Annas (1976, 30), and is one reason why both literalism and
fictionalism has been ascribed to Aristotle. I’ll next address each ascription in turn.
2

2

Translations based on those collected in McKeon (1941). Cf. Phys. II.2 (194a9-12): “Geometry investigates physical lines but
not qua physical.” Also Meta. K.3. (1061a34).

3

Two compounds of hairein are used. First, compounds with peri are used to describe the ‘stripping off’ of the nonmathematical
properties of sensible objects to leave only the mathematical. Other compounds--for example, ana-hairein (‘extract’: Phys. I.4)
and dia-hairesis (‘division’: Phys. III.6)--are used in senses unrelated to mathematical abstraction. Cf. Meta. Z.3 (1029a11). The
second compounds are compounds with apo; this is a rare use in verb form. APo. I.5 (74a37-b1). Also Meta. Z.3 (1029a16), a
passage whose credibility for the ascription of any view to Aristotle I will draw into question later. There are other uses of
apahiresis unrelated to mathematical abstraction: for example, Meta. D.22 (1022b31), with apahiresis associated with privation.
More common are substantive phrases such as ta ex aphaireseos legomena, used in explicit apposition with ta mathematika, De
Caelo (299a14-18); perhaps not referring to strictly mathematical abstract objects, APo. I.18 (81b3); as ta en aphairesei
legomena, De An. III.7 (431b12-13), III.8 (432b5); as ta ne aphairesei onta, De An. III.4 (429b21); as ta di’ aphaireseos estin in
apposition with ta mathematika and contrasted with ex empeirias, NE (1042a18). The various ta … legomena constructions are
ambiguous. Ross translates as “the so-called ...”; an alternative reading is “the things said as a result of ...”.
4
to separate (chorizein) from matter (hyle), De An. III.4 (429b21); without an indirect object, Meta. M.3 (quoted below); cf.
apotemonenai, Meta. G.1 (1003a24-5); perigrapsomenai, Meta. E.1.
5
Hardie and Gaye’s translation of this dative phrase as “in thought,” suggests a locative sense. However, this is a rare use of the
dative (see Sonneschein §434); the sense may be instead instrumental. More common is the use of the Greek he, or ‘qua’,
discussed above.
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I’ll begin by briefly considering literalism in recent philosophy of mathematics. I have noted that mathematical
statements, as standardly interpreted, commit us to the existence of mathematical objects. In contemporary
philosophy of mathematics the most pressing difficulty with such commitment is epistemological. As Benacerraf
(1973) framed the issue, if there is a transcendent world of mathematical entities, it is unclear how such a world
could cause our knowledge of it. The difficulty, then, is to reconcile ontological commitment and a causal account of
knowledge.
Mathematical literalists6 accept that mathematics commits us to the existence of mathematical objects and
attempt to avoid the epistemological difficulties resulting from this commitment by arguing that we indeed do have
perceptual knowledge of these mathematical objects. On this account then, we simply are in causal interaction with
mathematical objects. Penelope Maddy, for example, argues that we simply perceive sets.7 She calls such settheoretical realism Aristotelian, not Platonic in part “since sets, on the view [she is] concerned with, are taken to be
individuals or particulars, not universals.”8 Donald Gillies has endorsed some of Maddy’s views and also the
designation of these views as Aristotelian.9 Gillies writes that it seems “highly plausible to claim that sets exist in
the material world. Examples of naturally occurring sets would be: the stars of a galaxy, the planets of the solar
system.... If sets exist in the material world, then it seems reasonable to suppose that we might on occasion perceive
a set with our senses.”10
The ascription of literalism to Aristotle has textual support. Recall that, in passages such as 193b23-25,
quoted above, Aristotle asserts that mathematical objects are part of the physical world. But can Aristotle mean that
all mathematical objects whatsoever are physical? The set-theoretical literalism of Maddy and Gillies may be a
plausible position, but extending literalism to other branches of mathematics is problematic. For physical objects
lack the exactitude characteristic of many kinds of mathematical objects. It seems, for example, that we do not
encounter perfectly straight lines in the physical world. The ascription of literalism to Aristotle, then, saddles him
with an implausible view.
The best developed literalist interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics is to be found in
Mueller (1969). Mueller resolves the problem that most mathematical properties of sensible substances lack the
exactitude characteristic of the subject matter of mathematics by arguing that Aristotle’s claim that the physical
world contains mathematical objects is merely the claim that the physical world contains a matter of pure
extension⎯whose only features are length, width and depth⎯and that this is also the basis of geometric objects. So,
on Mueller’s view, Aristotle does not claim that all mathematical objects are contained in the physical world.
Rather, he holds that the physical and mathematical realms overlap. Although physical lines and triangles lack the
exactitude characteristic of geometric objects, the physical world shares with mathematics the precise extensional
features of length, width and depth.
Mueller’s view is not obviously incorrect; and the Phys. 2.2 passage quoted above might be read so to lend
some support to it. However, an unattractive result of this view is that Aristotle’s claim that the physical world
contains mathematical objects is severely restricted. The physical world only contains only a small part of
geometry.11 There is a view ascribable to Aristotle, however, which allows that much of geometry is contained in the
world without ascribing to Aristotle the implausible view that there are in the physical world exact geometric
figures. Aristotle carefully distinguishes between individuals and universals within all categories. This individual
triangle may be imperfect but it is an individual falling under a sortal, triangularity, which perfectly exhibits the
exactitude expected of mathematics. After all, the universal is common to all instances of triangles and, if the
universal triangle lacked the exactitude of mathematical triangles, it would be limited as to what individuals could
be instances of it.

6

The term is Chihara’s (1990, 3ff.).
Maddy (1980, 178ff.); also Maddy (1990).

7
8

Maddy (1980, 163).

9

Gillies (1992, 266ff.).
Gillies (ms., 9). Gillies believes that sets are perceptible since observation is theory-laden. Set-theoretic literalism has received
some critical attention; see, for example, Chihara (1990, 194-215).
11
In response, Lear (1982) argues that it is not so implausible to ascribe to Aristotle the view that there are in fact exact
mathematical objects such as triangles in the world. This allows much more of mathematics to be contained in the physical world
than Mueller’s view allows. However, there are unattractive results of this view as well. For although the physical world contains
most of geometry, in Lear’s view, standard geometry is a part of a mere sliver of the physical world.
10
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It’s perhaps Aristotle’s view that both the individual property of being this particular imperfect triangle and
the perfect universal of triangularity are present in the individual sensible substance which has the property of being
triangular. This view has the result that mathematics studies a significant number of mathematical properties of
sensible substances. Mueller (1970, 162-3) canvasses this proposal and objects to it on the grounds that universals
lack exactitude and that Greek math does not study universals but relies on spatial intuitions about representative
individuals, not universals. Mueller’s example in defense of the claim that universals lack exactitude defends a
somewhat different point: Mueller (1970, 162) notes that “circularity does not touch straightness in a point or in any
other way,” but this would support the claim that mathematicians study representative individuals, not universals.
Mathematical properties of sensible substances are universals but mathematicians treat them as if they were
representative individuals as part of the mathematical fiction, of which I’ll say more below. Generally, the question
of mathematical practice is different from the question of the relation between mathematical objects and the sensible
world.12
However, if this is Aristotle’s view, then he would reject the literalist view that we can perceive
mathematical objects. For the subject matter of mathematics are certain universal properties of sensible substances,
and Aristotle holds that we do not directly perceive universals. We come to grasp universals rather through a process
of induction beginning with perception.13
3
I turn to fictionalism in contemporary philosophy of mathematics, the ascription of fictionalism to Aristotle and the
points of agreement and disagreement between Aristotle and fictionalists. As I’ve noted, if you deny the existence of
mathematical objects, then it seems that you must reject all claims that commit you to such objects, which means
rejecting most of mathematics as standardly understood. Contemporary mathematical fictionalists such as Hartry
Field accept this consequence. According to mathematical fictionalism, mathematicians make the fictitious
assumption that mathematical objects exist: such an assumption, they admit, is false; but the fiction, they assure us,
is harmless and useful. Fictionalists disarm the apparent commitment to mathematical objects in mathematical
statements by showing how in principle these statements could be rewritten into synonymous statements which do
not have problematic ontological commitments. One strategy takes the form of a reduction to quantificational
statements. Although the nature of these quantifiers is controversial, I will present an example using existential
quantifiers: this is the simplest case. Consider the equation
(A) 2+3=5
A reductionist reading of this equation, with the numerical quantifier (∃n) an abbreviation for a sequence of n
distinct existential quantifiers, would translate (A) as follows:
(B) (∀V)(∀W)[(∃2x)(Vx)&(∃3x)(Wx)&~(∃x)(Vx&Wx)⊃(∃5x)(Vx∨Wx)].
That is, the equation 2+3=5 can be read as saying merely that if there are two Vs and three different Ws, then there
will be five things which are V or W. Where the arithmetical equation mentions abstract objects, the quantificational
statement is free of such reference. Such quantificational statements are elephantine: this is partly why mathematics
is a useful fiction.
Jonathan Lear and others have ascribed mathematical fictionalism to Aristotle.14 The ascription has some
initial plausibility. As we’ve seen, Aristotle sometimes describes the relation between mathematical objects and the
sensible world in ways which suggest fictionalism. For example, Aristotle claims that mathematicians separate
mathematical properties in thought. And this sounds rather like the claim that mathematical objects don’t exist but

12
Mueller raises some other objections to the proposal. Mueller objects that universals aren’t fully real; but Aristotle holds that
neither universals nor mathematical objects are unqualified beings; on this, see below. Finally, Mueller objects that, if
mathematical objects are universals, then Aristotle cannot distinguish between legitimate mathematical separation and
illegitimate separation of Platonic Forms. But Aristotle objects to the separation of Platonic Forms partly because they separate
what is even conceptually embodied. Aristotle uses the well-known contrast between the snub and the concave at Phys. 2.2
(194a7) to illustrate this point.
13
See, for example, De An. 2.5 (417b23).
14

See Lear 1982. Edward Hussey (1991) interprets mathematical objects as representational objects. Representational objects are
fictive objects with just those properties characterizing the class of physical objects represented. For the original exposition on
representational objects, see Kit Fine 1985. This form of fictionalism entails the rejection of the principle of bivalence; Aristotle
would resist such a result (except possibly for future contingent statements).
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mathematicians make the fictitious assumption that they do. Is this the right picture for Aristotle’s philosophy of
mathematics?
Aristotle holds that there are a variety of different kinds of entities: individual substances such as you and
me, universal substances such as humanity, and individuals and universals among such other categories as qualities
and quantities are all among things that have an ontological status. Of all these, only individual substances have their
ontological status independently of standing in a relation to some other kind of entity. All other entities have their
ontological status in virtue of standing in a relation to some individual substance or other.15 Mathematical objects
have their ontological status in virtue of being the properties of sensible substances. I believe that this is what
Aristotle means when he describes mathematical objects as existing “qualifiedly” at Metaphysics 1077B16,
contrasting this with the unqualified existence enjoyed by sensible individual substances, and what he means by
claiming, at 1078a21-22, quoted in the first section, that mathematical objects are not separate from sensible
substances.
For Aristotle, ontological dependence is closely connected to predicability. The predicability of an
expression suggests that the referent of that expression is ontologically dependent on another entity; the
impredicability of an expression, on the other hand, suggests that the referent of that expression is ontologically
independent. Expressions referring to individual substances are the only expressions which cannot be predicated of
another entity. Expressions referring to other kinds of entities are predicable of individual substances. This is
Aristotle’s methodology in the Categories: the predicability or impredicability of an expression provides a rationale
for classifying the referent of that expression as ontologically dependent or independent.
However, within mathematical discourse, certain mathematical objects play this role. Entities which are,
strictly speaking, the properties of sensible substances are, in mathematics, the subjects of predications. Consider a
mathematical claim such as ‘This triangle has interior angles equal to 180 degrees’. Here a mathematical property is
predicated of a subject which cannot be predicated of another mathematical entity. The impredicability of the
subject, within mathematical discourse, suggests that the referent of the expression is ontologically independent with
respect to other mathematical entities. I propose that this is, according to Aristotle, the conceit of mathematics⎯a
conceit which resembles mathematical fictionalism insofar as the mathematician treats mathematical objects with an
ontological status they in fact lack. However, where contemporary mathematical fictionalists hold that mathematics
treats what does not in fact exist as if it does exist, Aristotle holds that mathematics treats what exists qualifiedly as
if it exists unqualifiedly. I believe that this is what Aristotle means when he says, in the 1078a21-22 passage
mentioned above, that the mathematician separates what, strictly speaking, is not separate from sensible substances.
§
I’ll draw a few conclusions. Somewhat like the literalist, Aristotle holds that mathematical objects exist in the
physical world as the properties of sensible substances, although it may be that Aristotle would deny that
mathematical objects are themselves perceivable. Somewhat like the fictionalist, on the other hand, Aristotle holds
that mathematics ascribes to mathematical properties of sensible substances an ontological status they in fact lack;
unlike the fictionalist, Aristotle does not believe that this requires that we deny that mathematical objects exist.

15

Aristotle holds that substances, alone of the categories, are separate: see, for example, 185a31-2, 1029a27-8. I discuss the
evidence for taking this to mean that substances are ontologically independent from all other entities, in my prior work.
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